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Beyond wide agreement that many areas of contemporary policy making are 
unintelligible if processes that transcend the boundaries of individual states are not 
taken into account, analysts often disagree on how various ‘global’ and ‘local’ factors 
interact to produce policies and policy outcomes. The disagreement stems in part from 
the use of different analytic lenses, and specifically from the choice between 
‘statecentric’ and ‘polycentric’ lenses. This article examines the fundamental 
assumptions of these general perspectives with regard to the polity, politics and policy 
dimensions of global policy making, and surveys some of the research questions and 
findings that resulted from their use. It concludes that scholars and policy makers should 
treat the two analytical lenses as complementary, as each of them stimulates the analyst 
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There is wide agreement that many areas of contemporary policy making are 
unintelligible if observers do not take into account processes that transcend the 
boundaries of individual states: financial regulation, food safety standards, 
environmental management systems, taxation, intellectual property, telecommunication, 
infectious disease control, accounting standards, to name but a few policy domains 
where global factors can be expected to be influential, and sometimes decisive. Beyond 
that basic insight, though, there is little agreement among analysts on the relative 
importance of ‘global’ as opposed to more ‘local’ factors (however defined) and on how 
global and local factors interact to produce policies and policy outcomes. To be sure, 
disagreements often stem from differing interpretations of specific events or 
relationships: for instance, whether a particular policy choice was made mainly in order 
to protect the market share of a national industry vis-à-vis competitors based in 
jurisdictions where that policy was already implemented; or whether governments that 
are members of a particular international organization are more likely than others to 
adopt a certain policy. But sometimes interpretations of global dimensions of policy 
making vary for a more fundamental reason: analysts use different analytical lenses and 
hence see different things, even when they are trying to understand the dynamics of the 
same policy domain. 
This article considers two general analytical lenses, or perspectives, that can be used to 
study global policy, which will be called the ‘statecentric’ and ‘polycentric’ lens. The 
aim of the article is to highlight the respective assumptions of these perspectives and to 
review some of the research questions and findings that resulted from them. The terms 
“analytical lens” and “perspective” (which are employed synonymously) are used to 
emphasise that statecentrism and polycentrism are not “theories”, if theories are 
conceived as coherent sets of hypotheses about causal and constitutive relationships 
between phenomena. An analytical lens is rather a set of general assumptions, which 
form the basis on which a number of theories can be developed. Theories based on the 
same statecentric or polycentric assumptions may well be pointing in opposite 
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directions: for instance, a statecentric theory that expects a ruthless struggle for survival 
and dominance among self-interested states is clearly different from a statecentric 
theory that expects states to be deeply socialized in the respect for shared global norms. 
Similarly, a polycentric theory that assigns to multinational corporations a structurally 
dominant role in the global system is clearly different from a polycentric theory that 
expects a pluralistic balance of power between all kinds of nonstate actors. 
It should be stated at the outset that the relationship between the two lenses is not 
conceived here as intrinsically competitive. In some cases it may be fruitful to contrast 
theories derived from the two perspectives and compare their explanatory power in 
relation to certain policy cases. But in other circumstances the two analytical lenses are 
better seen as complementary: each of them stimulates the analyst to ask questions and 
look for entities and causal connections that the other lens may miss. In analogy to 
physical lenses, each of them allows the observer to see some objects more sharply 
while at the same time blurring the context or cutting it out altogether. 
The article consists of two main sections. The first section starts by outlining the key 
assumptions of the statecentric perspective with regard to the polity, the politics and the 
policy dimensions of policy making.1 It then shows that this perspective has led analysts 
to focus on three broad areas of research: global policy competition, global policy 
communication, and global policy cooperation. Some exemplary studies conducted on 
those research questions are mentioned. The second section outlines the key 
assumptions of the polycentric perspective, again with regard to the polity, the politics 
and the policy dimensions. It then discusses some emerging research agendas among 
analysts using this perspective, notably the theme of the inclusiveness and public 
accountability of private and hybrid governance arrangements. The concluding section 
offers some thoughts on the relationship between the two lenses.  
 
                                                 
1 ‘Polity’ refers to the boundaries and basic institutional features of the policy-making unit; 
‘politics’ refers to the process of interaction among actors and actor coalitions possessing 
various material and ideational resources and to the prevalent modes of interaction, such as 
fighting, arguing, bargaining and voting; ‘policy’ refers to the particular combination of goals 
and means ‘selected’ by the political process.    
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2. The statecentric perspective 
 
2.1 Assumptions 
Authors using a statecentric perspective make a simple assumption with regard to the 
polity that is the object of analysis: it is the state. The policies under consideration are 
thus instances of ‘public policy’, to the extent that public policy is equated with policy 
made by states, individually or collectively. (Section 3 considers this equation further). 
In relation to the dimension of politics, the assumption is that it occurs in two separate 
arenas: domestic and international. Domestic politics consists of the competition for 
influence on state policy making among groups variously organized as political parties, 
party factions, pressure groups, judicial bodies, semi-independent public authorities, etc. 
Depending on the key institutional features of the polity, electoral politics plays a larger 
or smaller role in shaping policies, but it always interacts with other mechanisms and 
channels of interest representation, such as corporatist arrangements, factional 
bargaining within parties, and contentious collective action. International politics, on the 
other hand, consists of interaction among governments, and it also can take a variety of 
forms: coercive diplomacy, bilateral and multilateral negotiations, reciprocal or 
unilateral policy adjustment, inclusion in and exclusion from policy arrangements, to 
mention just the most common. Domestic and international politics may be interpreted 
as functioning according to fundamentally different logics. For instance, a very 
influential approach in International Relations scholarship, structural Realism, is based 
on the assumption that domestic politics is based on the political ordering principle of 
hierarchy whereas international politics is based on the political ordering principle of 
anarchy (Waltz, 1979). But the assumption of a fundamental qualitative difference 
between the two domains is not a necessary component of the statecentric view. What is 
necessary is only that the two political domains are separate and that they are connected 
almost exclusively through governments. In other words, there is an ‘outside’ and an 
‘inside’ and governments are the only gatekeepers between them. 
One example of a theory based on statecentric assumptions is ‘liberal 
intergovernmentalism’, which has been developed by Andrew Moravcsik (1998) and 
other authors, mostly with reference to European rather than global integration. Liberal 
intergovernmentalism combines a ‘liberal’ approach to the formation of state 
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preferences (based on the issue-specific economic interests of powerful domestic 
constituents) with a bargaining theory of international negotiations (based on the 
relative power of states stemming from asymmetrical interdependence) and a functional 
theory of institutional choice (based on the role of international institutions in increasing 
the credibility of interstate commitments).   
The statecentric perspective has generated several research programmes that have 
greatly enriched our understanding of the global dimensions of policy making. These 
research programmes have clustered around three themes that can be called ‘global 
policy competition’, ‘global policy communication’, and ‘global policy cooperation’.2 
The order in which these themes are discussed in the remainder of this section reflects 
the minimum levels of interaction ‘density’, and hence opportunities for ‘socialization’ 
among policy makers, which are required for the relevant causal mechanisms to operate. 
In principle, competition requires very little interaction among decision-makers in 
different countries to produce an effect on policy, as a ‘natural’ selection mechanism 
may eliminate ‘unsuccessful’ policies and allow successful policies to survive and be 
replicated. In practice, however, decisions about which policies to adopt or abandon are 
often made after ascertaining which policies are implemented in other countries. 
Similarly, in principle communication may consist of the limited interaction involved in 
gathering information about foreign policy experiences, but in practice government 
officials exchange information on a much more regularized and institutionalized basis. 
Finally, cooperation almost always requires extensive interaction during pre-agreement 
negotiation and post-agreement verification of compliance. The following subsections 
present some exemplary findings.     
 
2.2. Global policy competition 
In academic and public debates it is often remarked that states design regulative and 
redistributive policies in such as way as to strengthen the competiveness of ‘domestic’ 
companies in global markets and the attractiveness of their own jurisdiction as a 
location for investments. Once a government changes its policies to protect ‘its’ 
                                                 
2 Because of space constraints, the article focuses on research on the interaction of policies and 
ignores the impact of other processes, such as the transnational diffusion of new technologies or 
policy-independent changes in the international flow of goods, services and capital. 
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companies or to attract capital, this results in a ‘policy externality’ for other 
governments, who are under pressure to change their policies as well. According to 
some authors, global competitive pressures are so strong that contemporary states have 
become ‘competition states’ (Cerny, 1997). Analysts often also predict the kind of 
policies that competition promotes: a general convergence towards policies that 
minimise costs for companies exposed to foreign competition and for transitionally 
mobile economic actors. In other words, competition is said to produce a ‘race to the 
bottom’ (RTB). From the point of view of the governments, the equilibrium outcome is 
suboptimal, since none gain any competitive advantage while their policies are more 
‘business-friendly’ than they would otherwise be – a classic instance of a ‘Prisoner’s 
Dilemma’.  
The competitive regulation hypothesis has generated much theoretical and empirical 
controversy. With regard to environmental regulation, for instance, there is considerable 
disagreement over the extent to which polluting industries relocate or expand in 
response to differences in regulatory stringency – the ‘pollution heavens’ hypothesis. 
While earlier research found no such effect, more recent research suggests that 
investment decisions are sensitive to differences in regulatory stringency, but the 
question is far from settled (Brunnermeier and Levinson, 2004; Spatareanu, 2007).  
More relevant for the purposes of this article is the question of whether governments 
perceive a problem of jurisdictional competition and change their policies in the 
expectation that industries will respond accordingly. Some studies have found that 
exposure to competition affects the likelihood that certain policies are adopted. 
Simmons and Elkins (2004), for instance, examined 182 states from 1967 to 1996 and 
found that countries were much more likely to adopt a liberal capital account policy if 
their direct competitors for capital had done so. In some cases, competition triggers 
reforms based on efficiency considerations. Thatcher (2007) found that regulatory 
competition was an important cause of the reform of French, German and Italian 
sectoral economic institutions in the areas of securities trading, telecommunications and 
airlines. Some of the extensive literature on the impact of globalization on the welfare 
state finds that, in some circumstances, increased participation in international trade and 
finance tends to reduce government spending and social welfare programmes (Brune 
and Garrett, 2005; Mosley, 2007).   
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On the whole, however, scholars tend to be more impressed by the relative scarcity of 
empirical evidence supporting the RTB hypothesis. For instance, Flanagan (2006) 
analyses data from a large sample of countries at various levels of economic 
development and finds no evidence that countries that are more open to international 
competition have weaker statutory labour protection. Holzinger et al. (2008), who 
examined twenty-four industrialised countries between 1970 and 2000, attempt but fail 
to find a significant effect of bilateral trade openness on environmental policy 
convergence.  
The logic of the RTB is intuitively compelling, and its empirical weakness calls for an 
explanation. At least seven possible explanations can be advanced. Some of them are 
based on the assumption that competitive pressures operate as posited, but that they are 
overridden by other factors. One explanation is that the global competitiveness of 
companies is only weakly affected by cross-national differences in environmental, 
labour, social and fiscal policies, and that the stringency of regulation or the tax burden 
is not a major determinant of investment decisions. A second explanation is that 
economic actors are sensitive to costs imposed by public policies, but many 
governments are held back from competitive regulation by domestic political and 
institutional constraints. Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) have presented a sustained 
argument to this effect in relation to tax competition. A third explanation suggests that 
there is little evidence of regulatory competition because governments anticipate its 
possibility and prevent it through international regulatory cooperation. A fourth 
explanation suggests that, in certain economic sectors, one or two countries have such a 
dominant position that they are unlikely to respond to competitive regulations enacted 
by lesser jurisdictions. Simmons (2001), for instance, argues that the market size and 
efficiency of U.S. financial services allowed the U.S. regulators to avoid a downward 
competitive spiral with foreign jurisdictions in financial market regulation. 
Other explanations for the lack of empirical evidence question or modify the internal 
logic of the RTB hypothesis. A fifth explanation agrees that regulatory competition 
matters and promotes policy convergence, but argues that it does not necessarily lead 
towards less stringent standards. On the contrary, it can produce a ‘race to the top’. 
Vogel (1995) famously noted that many U.S. states adopted California’s more stringent 
automobile emissions standards, since the benefits of accessing the Californian market 
 7
were large enough to justify a general improvement of standards. Vogel has called this 
dynamic the ‘California effect’, which forms the conceptual counterpart to the 
‘Delaware effect’, named after the most eager participant in the competition among U.S. 
states to offer business-friendly corporate chartering requirements. A sixth explanation 
maintains that, if some countries start out better endowed than others with features that 
make them attractive to investors, then capital mobility will increase rather than 
decrease policy heterogeneity (Rogowski, 2003). Finally, the absence of clear evidence 
for regulatory competition may be a result of the inadequate methodologies used to 
detect it (for a discussion see Franzese and Hays, 2008). 
 
2.3. Global policy communication 
Policies implemented abroad can be not only a source of externalities, but also a source 
of information. Policy makers often use information about experiences in other 
countries in the process of designing or reviewing policies in their own jurisdiction. 
Modes of communication and information transmission differ widely in terms of 
intensity, regularity and formalisation. At one extreme is the case of officials in national 
administrations who learn about foreign experiences by means of publicly available 
sources and have no or little interaction with policy makers of the countries where those 
experiences originated. An intermediate level of intensity, regularity and formalisation 
is represented by communication flows within transnational epistemic communities, 
which are usually defined as networks of professionals with recognised expertise in a 
particular domain and who share normative beliefs, causal beliefs, notions of validity, 
and a common policy enterprise (Haas, 1992, p.3). Members of such epistemic 
communities provide information to policy makers or may be directly involved in 
designing regulatory policies. At the more institutionalised end of the transnational 
communication spectrum are formalised benchmarking and peer review exercises. 
Prominent examples of transnational benchmarking exercises are OECD regulatory 
reviews, which started in 1998 and are based on self-reporting by national 
administrations, assessments by OECD staff and peer review among members states 
(Lodge, 2005). The review process is entirely voluntary, since states are neither obliged 
to undergo a review nor obliged to implement the recommendations they receive. 
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If it is relatively easy to agree on what channels of communication are available to 
policy-makers, there is more disagreement among scholars about which causal 
mechanisms are more likely to operate in cases of policy transfer. As a way of 
summarising the mechanisms that have been highlighted in the literature it is useful to 
refer to March and Olsen’s (1989) distinction between the logic of consequentialism and 
the logic of appropriateness and, as suggested by Risse (2000), to add ‘arguing’ and 
deliberation as a distinct logic. An explanatory approach based on the logic of 
consequentialism would assume that policy makers have clearly defined policy goals 
but imperfect information about cause-effect relationships. Gathering information about 
foreign experiences is thus a rational way to improve the likelihood that policies are 
designed in such a way that they attain the intended goals, in a process of Bayesian 
learning (Simmons et al., 2008. p.26).  
By contrast, explanatory approaches based on the logic of appropriateness focus on the 
social construction of norms of appropriate behaviour. The goals of the policy makers 
are not considered to be exogenous to the interaction with their foreign ‘peers’, but are 
developed with reference to foreign models that are considered as ‘legitimate’ within 
the reference group. Simmons et al. (2008) refer to this mechanism as emulation. In 
principle emulation can occur at a distance, but often it is the result of socialisation 
processes that take place through interaction within institutional contexts. In 
international relations, emulation has been examined in depth by the ‘world polity’ 
approach developed by John Meyer with numerous colleagues (e.g. Meyer et al., 1997). 
In this version of sociological institutionalism, state officials orient their behaviour to 
global norms about what constitutes a legitimate polity and what goals it should 
legitimately pursue. 
Risse (2000) suggests that the logic of arguing is distinct from both the logic of 
consequentialism and the logic of appropriateness. Decision makers who adopt this 
logic while interacting with one another do not aim merely at updating their knowledge 
about cause-effect relationships, nor do they follow predetermined norms of appropriate 
behaviour for a given situation, but are willing to modify their goals as a result of 
persuasion. While of course no real-world setting corresponds to the ideal situation 
identified by discourse ethics theorists such as Jürgen Habermas (1981), a number of 
scholars maintain that certain transnational forums can and do function according to a 
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deliberative mode. Participants in these forums are seen as making a genuine effort to 
find solutions that can be accepted by others on the basis of a process of mutual reason 
giving and openness to learning about current best practices. Cohen and Sabel (2005) 
call such settings ‘deliberative polyarchy.’ Slaughter (2004, pp.204-5) also argues that 
‘government networks’ – among national regulators, judges or legislators – can meet the 
conditions required for open, genuine and productive discussion.  
There is some empirical evidence confirming the impact of transnational 
communication on regulatory policies. Raustiala (2002), for instance, discusses a 
number of cases in which US regulators successfully ‘exported’ their approaches in the 
areas of securities regulation, competition and antitrust law, and environmental policy. 
As noted above, transnational communication may trigger both rational learning and 
normative emulation, but estimating the relative importance of these mechanisms is a 
difficult task for researchers. In an important study of government downsizing from 
1980 to 1997 among twenty-six OECD member countries, Lee and Strang (2006) found 
that countries learn from each other but that this learning process is heavily influenced 
by prior ‘theoretical’ expectations. Reductions in government employment by a trade 
partner or neighbour lead to reductions in the size of the public sector, whereas 
increases in government employment by the same partners or neighbours have 
negligible effects. This suggests that downsizing is contagious but upsizing is not. 
Countries appear to be sensitive to evidence that downsizing works, since they tend to 
reduce public employment when recent downsizers experienced rapid growth and 
improving trade balances and when recent upsizers faced slow growth and worsening 
trade. But they do not react to information about strong economic performance by 
upsizers nor weak performance by downsizers. Lee and Strang (2006, p.904) conclude 
that ‘[e]mpirical outcomes that confirm expectations reinforce behavior, while outcomes 
that contradict expectations are discounted. In short, when theories and evidence come 
into conflict, theories win.’  
The assessment of the importance of deliberative modes of communication has proven 
even more difficult than grasping processes of rational learning and emulation. Cohen 
and Sabel (2005) see elements of deliberative polyarchy especially in the institutions of 
the European Union, but they detect embryonic forms of it also in global forums such as 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CDC).  
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 2.4. Global policy cooperation 
A third way in which the global context can affect public policies is through cooperation, 
i.e. the commitment to implement certain policies in the context of agreements with 
other governments. International cooperation often consists of reciprocal commitments 
to harmonise policies across countries, but it can also consist of highly asymmetrical 
agreements, such as the promise to implement a structural adjustment programme in 
order to receive loans from the IMF. Studies on international policy cooperation tend to 
focus either on the causes of international commitments or on their consequences, 
notably whether and why governments comply with them and actually adjust their 
policies (of course some approaches – notably rational-choice analyses – treat expected 
consequences as causes). The causes of cooperation can be roughly divided into those 
related to transnational interdependencies and externalities and those related to domestic 
politics. 
Among those statecentric approaches to international cooperation that stress the role of 
transnational interdependencies, rationalist institutional theory has been particularly 
influential since the early 1980s, and the following discussion will focus on it. 3  
Rationalist institutionalists want to explain when and how states succeed in cooperating 
for mutual advantage despite international anarchy, i.e. the absence of a supranational 
government capable to enforce agreements in the international sphere (e.g. Keohane, 
1984). The starting point of rationalist institutionalism is the existence of significant 
physical or policy externalities which create a situation of strategic interdependence 
among governments. With the help of basic game-theoretical concepts, institutionalists 
identified several types of strategic situations, among which the Prisoner’s Dilemma and 
a coordination game known as Battle of the Sexes are particularly prominent. The Race-
to-the-Bottom hypothesis, for instance, is often modelled as a Prisoner’s Dilemma 
caused by policy externalities. Genschel and Plümper (1997) apply this logic in their 
argument that the central banks of the world’s main financial centres resorted to 
multilateral action with regard to capital ratio requirements because keeping high 
                                                 
3  For a broader survey including non-rationalist approaches see Koenig-Archibugi 
(forthcoming). 
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standards unilaterally might have undermined the international competitiveness of 
national banks. A crucial tenet of institutionalism is that states can increase the 
likelihood of successful cooperation by manipulating the informational context in which 
they act, most notably by creating international institutions.  The basic idea on the link 
between cooperation problems and institutional arrangements is that ‘form follows 
function’.  Institutions can contribute to solving ‘coordination’ problems by providing a 
favourable context for bargaining and, crucially, by presenting focal points to 
negotiators. Examples of this function are many of the technical standards developed by 
the International Organisation for Standardisation. The definition of common standards 
for, say, the dimensions of freight containers may involve intense distributional 
conflicts, but the institution does not need an extensive monitoring mechanism since it 
is generally not in the interest of governments, port authorities and companies to deviate 
from the standard dimensions once they have been agreed. By contrast, institutions 
dealing with ‘collaboration’ problems, such as the Prisoners’ Dilemma, must be 
designed in such a way that the incentive to defect from agreements is minimised:  to do 
so, they must help trust-building among states, define obligations and cheating, improve 
the monitoring of compliance, and facilitate the decentralised sanctioning of cheaters. 
An example is the decision to facilitate the monitoring and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights (IPR) protection by bringing IPR under the relatively robust dispute 
resolution mechanism of the GATT/World Trade Organisation. 
There is a lively debate among authors working within a statecentric rational-choice 
approach on various aspects of rational institutionalism. Authors such as Krasner (1991) 
and Simmons (2001), for instance, stress the importance of power asymmetries in 
shaping the process and the content of policy cooperation. One aspect of this is the 
attempt by states to shift the locus of negotiation and implementation to those 
institutions that are most likely to produce a distribution of gains that is particularly 
favourable to them.  An example is the successful attempt by the U.S. and other states to 
shift international negotiations on the regulation of intellectual property rights from the 
World Intellectual Property Organisations to the WTO (Helfer, 2004).  A more inclusive 
institution in terms of membership can be the result of the capacity of a stronger state to 
remove the status quo from the set of options available to weaker states (Gruber, 
2000). With regard to the domain of banking regulation, Genschel and Plümper (1997) 
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argue that, when in 1987 the British and U.S. regulators reached an agreement on a 
common capital adequacy standard and Japan joined it, all other member states of the 
Bank for International Settlements had no choice but to join as well and agreement on a 
common standard was reached quickly. Simmons (2001) examined several cases of 
financial market regulation in the 1980s and 1990s and, consistent with her theoretical 
framework that stresses the autonomous nature of regulatory innovation in the dominant 
financial centre, she argues that most of the regulatory harmonisation resulted less from 
mutual adjustment than from unilateral decisions imposed by the United States.  
As noted above, the existence of transnational policy or physical externalities is not the 
only reason why governments may choose to cooperate with one another. International 
policy cooperation may be a rational response to constraints stemming from the 
domestic politics of individual countries. If parliaments and executives often delegate 
regulatory authority to independent agencies to remove it from pressure-group politics 
and lengthen the time horizon of decisions, they may also be willing to shift regulatory 
tasks to international arenas in order to increase their policy influence vis-à-vis other 
domestic actors or to make it more difficult for future governments to reverse policy 
decisions made by the present government (Moravcsik, 1994). Governments sometimes 
find that international cooperation is useful to gain influence in the domestic political 
arena and to overcome internal opposition to their preferred policies, and in some 
circumstances international governance may be the outcome of ‘collusive delegation’ 
(Koenig-Archibugi, 2004a). For instance, after controlling for other variables that may 
explain the probability of entering into IMF arrangements, countries with a larger 
number of domestic veto players are more likely to enter an IMF programme (Vreeland, 
2007). This suggests that governments may want IMF conditions to be ‘imposed’ on 
them in order to help them overcome domestic political constraints on economic reform. 
To the extent that this mechanism reveals a political cleavage that cuts across state 
borders, however, it is more compatible with a polycentric than a statecentric 
perspective, as it is argued below. 
Recent rationalist institutional work has emphasised that, while the power of 
international organisations results from delegation of authority from member states, the 
effect of those organisations cannot be reduced to the interests of the states, given the 
significant potential for agency slack (see e.g. Hawkins et al., 2006). In addition to 
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fruitful specific research questions, this emphasis has wider implications in terms of the 
general analytical lens to be used to observe and explain global policy. Much more than 
was the case in the first wave of rationalist institutionalism, international organizations 
emerge as distinct actors that, while constrained by their role as ‘agents’ of states, 
possess and pursue autonomous goals and resources in world politics. This signals that 
an extremely influential IR theory is replacing its statecentric lenses with polycentric 
lenses. 
In sum, statecentric analyses have contributed greatly to our understanding of global 
policy cooperation, but rationalist scholars are progressively abandoning the notion that 
such cooperation can be explained exclusively through statecentric lenses. The next 
section explores the added value of using polycentric lenses. 
 
3. The polycentric perspective 
 
3.1. Assumptions 
The statecentric perspective never lacked challengers, but since the end of the Cold War 
there has been an increasing number of attempts to develop alternative conceptual 
frameworks.4 Jan Aart Scholte (2008, p.18) has recently listed some of the labels used 
to capture the nature of contemporary governance: ‘plurilateralism,’ ‘polylateralism,’ 
‘networked governance,’ ‘complex multilateralism,’ ‘empire,’ ‘new medievalism,’ 
‘global issues networks,’ ‘cosmocracy,’ ‘mobius-web governance,’ ‘complex 
sovereignty,’ and ‘disaggregated world order.’ Scholte himself has provided a 
particularly clear elaboration of the idea that a fundamental change in the nature of 
governance is underway, which he conceptualizes in terms of six shifts: (a) from 
country units to what he calls ‘transscalar spaces’; (b) from state actors to multiple types 
of actors, such as local governments, regional institutions, global agencies, business 
consortia and civil society associations; (c) from unitary states to states that are 
disaggregated into multiple relatively autonomous policy decision points; (d) from 
centralized decision-making to decision-making that is dispersed across multiple and 
                                                 
4 On the broader debate about statism and territorialism in global politics see for instance 
Agnew and Corbridge (1995), Held et al. (1999), Krasner (1999) and Ferguson and Mansbach 
(2004). 
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diverse institutions and networks; (e) from discrete to overlapping jurisdictions; and (f) 
from sovereignty to a post-sovereign system of divided authority. Scholte summarizes 
these shifts as an on-going transition from statist to polycentric governance (Scholte, 
2008, pp.13-19). 
If polycentrism is seen as an analytical lens rather than as a mode of governance, it can 
be described as resting on the following assumptions with regard to polity, policy and 
politics. The polity to be analysed is not necessarily the state: in principle it can be any 
entity that is able to produce governance and formulate and implement policy. Rosenau, 
for instance, argues that the study of global governance should focus on myriad ‘spheres 
of authority’ observable in the contemporary world, which may or may not be 
coterminous with a bounded territory and are ‘distinguished by the presence of actors 
who can evoke compliance when exercising authority as they engage in the activities 
that delineate the sphere’ (Rosenau, 2006, p.117). Ferguson and Mansbach (2004, p.24) 
focus on a set of somewhat more tightly delimited entities: ‘Polities are collectivities 
with a measure of identity, hierarchy, and capacity to mobilize followers for political 
purposes (that is, value satisfaction or relief from value deprivation).’ Clearly these and 
other definitions to be found in the literature encompass a wide range of entities. Some 
authors have attempted to manage conceptual complexity by developing typologies of 
governance-producing entities or polities. Koenig-Archibugi (2002), for instance, 
argues that governance arrangements can be seen as varying along three main 
dimensions – publicness, delegation and inclusiveness – and as conforming to a larger 
or smaller extent to eight ideal types. However, the key heuristic assumption of the 
polycentric perspective is that observers should remain open-minded as to where policy 
making may emerge and develop methodological tools that can identify and assess 
governance arising from unexpected sites. 
The polycentric perspective does not assume a fundamentally different understanding of 
politics than the statecentric perspective: it still can be interpreted as the process by 
which actors and coalitions of actors use material and ideational power resources to 
engage in cooperation, competition and conflict with one another, with the aim of 
bringing about policies that promote their interests and values. What is different is the 
pattern of conflictual and cooperative interactions that the analyst expects to see, and 
specifically the kinds of political cleavages that are possible and probable in global 
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politics. As noted above, the statecentric perspective assumes that societal cleavages 
within states determine the policy preferences of governments and then the resulting 
cleavages between governments generate patterns of international interaction, which 
may be more or less competitive and cooperative. In other words, domestic preferences, 
bargaining power and institutions combine to generate state preferences over policies; 
then state preferences, bargaining power and international institutions combine to 
generate international policy cooperation and competition. The polycentric perspective, 
by contrast, makes the crucial assumption that some important political cleavages cut 
across state borders. Some issues pit coalitions composed of actors based in different 
states, i.e. transnational coalitions, against other actors who are primarily based in a 
particular state or who are themselves part of transnational coalitions. These actors can 
be governments, other public bodies such as independent regulatory authorities, 
international bureaucracies, and various types of ‘private’ (i.e., nonstate) actors, such as 
companies and business associations, civil society organizations and social movements, 
epistemic communities. The following are some of the political cleavages revealed by 
polycentric lenses on global politics, which would be obscured by an exclusive reliance 
on statecentric lenses.   
A transnational coalition of private actors versus another private actor. Examples of 
this cleavage are transnational networks of labour rights activists that span developed 
and developing countries and that put pressure on large companies, for instance by 
promoting consumer boycotts, in order to improve labour standards in those companies’ 
global supply chains (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004a).     
A transnational coalition of private actors versus a single government. Examples of this 
cleavage are campaigns by transnational human rights associations, such as Amnesty 
International, aimed at stopping the use of torture and other human rights violations by 
specific governments (Risse et al., 1999). Other examples are transnational coalitions of 
environmentalists and indigenous peoples aimed at resisting tropical deforestation and 
other environmentally damaging government policies (Keck and Sikkink ,1998). Yet 
another example of this type of cleavage are members of ethnic communities residing in 
various countries who mobilize politically against the governments of their ‘home’ 
country, as happened with parts of the Kurdish, Kosovar, and Tamil diasporas, who 
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supported political and armed opposition to the Turkish, Yugoslav and Sri Lankan 
governments respectively (Adamson, 2006).   
A transnational coalition of governments versus a private actor. An example of this 
cleavage is the alliance between a reform-minded government and foreign governments, 
often through institutions such as the IMF, against domestic opponents of economic 
reform, e.g. on the issue of reduction of public spending (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004b). 
For instance, Vreeland (2003) shows that in 1990 the Uruguayan president signed an 
agreement with the IMF mainly because he wanted IMF conditionality to be imposed, in 
order to help him overcome the resistance to economic reforms that was mounted by 
Uruguayan trade unions, pensioners’ organizations and the main opposition party. A 
rather different example of this cleavage is the collaboration of governments against 
pirates, which considerably reduced the role of non-state violence in the past two 
centuries but is still ongoing in some parts of the world (Thomson, 1994; Archibugi and 
Chiarugi, 2009). 
A transnational coalition of sectoral state actors versus other sectoral state actors. As 
emphasised by Slaughter (2004) and Scholte (2008), different sectors of the state – such 
as ministries, regulators, judges, and parliamentarians – may not only have their distinct 
goals, but also pursue these goals by collaborating with their counterparts in other 
countries. A sectoral state actor may even enlist like-minded foreign counterparts or 
international agencies as allies in order to gain influence in negotiations with other 
sectors of its own state. For instance, in Somalia in 1984 the finance minister and other 
economic ministers tried to use negotiations with the IMF on an extended loan 
arrangement to promote economic liberalization against the opposition of party and 
military members of the council of ministers (Kahler, 1993). Similarly, Pakistan’s 
finance minister is said to have ‘specifically requested the managing director of the IMF 
to include in the routine surveillance report on his country a reference to the need to cut 
military expenditures’ (Pauly 1997, cited by Vreeland, 2007, p.65). These and other 
examples show that state actors may engage in international collusion not only against 
private actors but also against other sectors of their own state. 
A transnational coalition of private actors versus another transnational coalition of 
private actors. Following the call of the founders of the European labour movements 
(‘workers of all lands, unite!’), transnational union organizations are increasingly 
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engaged in cross-border campaigns against, and collective bargaining with, 
transnational companies and their subsidiaries, which often results in ‘international 
framework agreements’ (Bronfenbrenner, 2007). Capital-labour interaction is formally 
institutionalized in the International Labour Organization, where labour representatives 
from 183 countries negotiate with employers’ representatives and government delegates 
to create and monitor international labour standards (Haas, 1964). 
A transnational coalition of private actors against a transnational coalition of 
governments. An example is the collaboration between like-minded terrorist groups 
aimed at destabilizing and influencing governments, and the collective action taken by 
those governments with regard to intelligence sharing, restrictions of financial 
transactions, political pressure, and military intervention against terrorist networks. 
Perhaps most interesting of all is the most complex constellation: a transnational 
coalition of private and state actors versus another transnational coalition of private 
and state actors. One example of this cleavage is the conflict between actors promoting 
stricter tobacco control and those opposing it since the 1990s. The broad pro-regulation 
coalition was institutionalized in bodies such as the Policy Strategy Advisory 
Committee of the Tobacco Free Initiative, which was set up by the World Health 
Organization and included representatives from the World Bank, Unicef, World Self 
Medication Industry, International Nongovernmental Coalition Against Tobacco, the 
Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention. The anti-regulation coalition included the world’s main tobacco companies, 
and various governments joined the anti-regulation or the pro-regulation coalition 
during the negotiation process that led to the Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control (Collin et al., 2002; Yach et al., 2006). Another example is the campaign 
promoted by the Coalition for an International Criminal Court (CICC), to which over 
800 organizations adhered. The CICC included most of the 237 NGOs officially 
accredited at the 1998 Rome conference on the international criminal court and played a 
major role in spurring and supporting pro-court governments in their difficult 
negotiations with those governments that preferred a weak court or no court at all 
(Glasius, 2006).  
These examples illustrate patterns of conflict and cooperation that cut across state 
boundaries and require polycentric analytical lenses to be identified. This does not mean 
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that cross-cutting political dynamics are more important than situations in which 
domestic political processes are distinct from international processes and governments 
act as gatekeepers between the two domains (e.g. governments aggregate domestic 
preferences on trade policy and negotiate with one another on that basis). The relative 
plausibility of statecentric and polycentric explanations is an empirical question that 
needs to be ascertained case by case. But a case can be made that analysts should start 
by employing the wider perspective, i.e. polycentric lenses, and avoid exclusive reliance 
on research designs that make it difficult to capture cross-cutting dynamics, such as the 
common use of a country as unit of quantitative analysis (‘methodological statism’). 
Polycentric assumptions about policy stem directly from the preceding argument. To the 
extent that analysts are interested in the policies that result from important political 
processes and are likely to be consequential, they should not limit themselves to 
examining ‘public policy’, if this expression is taken to be equivalent to ‘state policy’. 
However, this is not the only possible interpretation of ‘public policy’. Terry Macdonald, 
for instance, has suggested that ‘power should be designated as ‘public’ and subject to 
democratic control whenever it impacts in some problematic way upon the capacity of a 
group of individuals to lead autonomous lives’ (Macdonald, 2008, p.35, emphasis 
removed). By extension, public policy might be defined as policy that has that kind of 
effect on individual lives. Examining whether this conceptual shift would bring real 
analytical advantages is however beyond the scope of this article.   
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3.2. Research agendas 
As has been argued above, the statecentric perspective to the global dimensions of 
policy has generated a set of clearly defined lines of enquiry that allow a fruitful 
interaction between progressively refined hypotheses and the accumulation of evidence. 
For instance, the assumption of the state as the basic unit of analysis facilitated the 
creation of databases that made possible sophisticated statistical analyses of 
international competition, communication and cooperation. The polycentric perspective 
has not yet matched those achievements, in part because research programmes in this 
tradition cannot rely on a predefined unit of analysis, but must devote considerable 
attention and energy to the definition and empirical identification of their ‘objects’.  
Researchers have identified a large number of areas where transnational non-statist 
governance arrangements create and implement policies, either of a regulative or an 
allocative kind: environmental management systems, carbon trading, sustainable 
forestry, maritime transport, online commerce, financial transactions involving swaps 
and derivatives, jurisprudence, accounting standards, credit rating, technical product 
standards, development aid, health services, labour standards, arms control (landmines), 
‘fair’ trade, medical research, commercial arbitration, to name only some of the most 
prominent areas.5 In addition to pursuing the general aim of identifying the variety of 
governance arrangements that produce policy in particular domains, analysts using 
polycentric lenses also ask questions on the causes and the consequences of non-state 
policy making. 
Research on the causes often proceeds from the question of why policy making in a 
particular area is dominated by non-state actors rather than state actors, or vice versa. 
An aspect of this question is whether that predominance is stable or whether (and why) 
there has been a shift from one policy making mode to the other. Broadly speaking, 
interpretations tend to be located somewhere between a societal and a statist pole. 
According to the societal intepretation, public/intergovernmental governance emerges 
when and where there is demand from powerful private actors, and it is designed to 
serve their interests. According to the statist interpretation, private/transnational 
                                                 
5  A small selection of studies on these governance arrangements is: Cutler et al., 1999; 
Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000; Ronit and Schneider, 2000; Falkner, 2003; Slaughter, 2004; 
Koenig-Archibugi and Zürn, 2006; Vogel, 2009. 
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governance emerges when and where it is stimulated by powerful states, and it is 
designed to serve their interests. An example of a societal explanation is provided by 
Mugge (2006). He assumes that the choice is determined mainly by the demands of 
producers located in key jurisdictions, since usually regulators will be most sensitive to 
their preferences. He argues that the choice between private and public regulation in a 
particular economic sector depends on the intensity of the competition among the main 
companies in that sector. If the competitive struggle is intense, the market incumbents 
will support public regulation as a means to stave off the challengers. If those struggles 
have settled and the population of companies is stabilised, the companies in the sector 
concerned will prefer and achieve transnational private regulation. According to Mugge, 
the case of derivative listings illustrates the first scenario, while the Eurobond market 
illustrates the case of a stable population of incumbent companies that banded together 
to fend off public governance. 
To be sure, polycentric analysts stress that the choice is not simply between statist and 
non-statist governance. They point out that civil society 
organisations, companies, national public agencies and intergovernmental organisations 
often form what have been called ‘multistakeholder’ policy networks that seek to agree 
on consensual policy solutions for specific sectors. For instance, the Kimberley Process 
on diamonds from conflict zones created a hybrid regulatory framework that combines 
an intergovernmental regime, which sets standards on the import and export of rough 
diamonds and the tracking of illicit diamonds, and a self-regulatory system that obliges 
companies to adopt stringent standards with regard to purchases and sales of diamonds 
and jewellery containing diamonds, including independent monitoring (Kantz, 2007). 
The Kimberley Process is a prominent example of a transnational regulatory regime that 
originated from an NGO campaign and from the response by industry and governments 
– in this case the market-leading De Beers Corporation and the South African 
government, which were concerned about possible consumer reactions triggered by the 
campaign. Polycentric analysts are interested in why the policy response to the problem 
of conflict diamonds took this hybrid institutional form.  
Polycentric research also investigates the consequences of non-statist arrangements on 
policy. One research agenda focuses on the policy process. For instance, Porter and 
Ronit (2006) examine the different stages of the policy process in private self-regulation 
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and highlight the similarities and differences in relation to the corresponding stage in 
public policy processes. Another research agenda focuses on the policy output. It is 
often argued that private ‘self-regulation’ is mainly a way to prevent public regulation 
and thus the standards emerging by non-state policy can be expected to be less strict 
than those that would emerge from a public policy process, all else being equal. For 
instance, Kolk et al. (1999) compared 132 codes of corporate conduct created by four 
different types of actors - individual companies,  business associations, social interest 
groups, and international organizations – and find that codes issued by business  
associations have the weakest scores with regard to focus, measurability and compliance 
mechanisms.  
An important line of research examines the consequences of polycentric policy making 
for democracy. One common position is that polycentrism is inherently unable to ensure 
the degree of inclusiveness and participation that genuinely democratic governance 
requires (e.g. Marchetti, 2008). Other analysts maintain that democratic forms of 
authorization and accountability can in principle be realized in non-state governance 
arrangements, even if existing instances still fall short of democratic criteria (e.g. 
Macdonald and Macdonald, 2006; Macdonald, 2008, Scholte, 2008). One important 
dimension is the ability of transnational civil society to promote new forms of 
democratic politics (Della Porta 2009). Several  theoretical and empirical contributions 
make this bundle of issues one of the most interesting areas of investigation within the 
broader polycentric research programme.6
 
4. Conclusion 
A vast amount of research has been conducted on the global dimensions of policy and 
there are reasons to believe that research in this field will grow at a faster rather than 
slower rate in the next few years. Scholars, and even more so policy makers, may find it 
increasingly difficult to absorb all the findings that may be relevant to their areas of 
interest. As a result, they may be tempted to focus their attention on clusters of research 
that share similar ontological and methodological assumptions. This article has 
                                                 
6 A small selection: Börzel and Risse, 2005; Held and Koenig-Archibugi, 2005; Papadopoulos, 
2007; Dingwerth, 2007; Meidinger, 2008; Koenig-Archibugi 2010.  
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illustrated some reasons why such a temptation should be resisted. Statecentric lenses 
on global policy have generated a wealth of significant and policy-relevant findings. 
This is due not only to the undeniable substantive importance of states as authors of 
policy and as targets for other policy-seeking actors, but also to the methodological 
advantages of using states as predefined units of analysis. Polycentric lenses on global 
policy, on the other hand, have revealed policy making entities, political cleavages, and 
policy outcomes that would have been obscured by an exclusive reliance on statecentric 
assumptions. Recent progress in devising theoretical and methodological tools for the 
analysis of non-statist governance suggests that this perspective may one day match the 
achievements of statecentric analyses.  
Is it possible and desirable to aim for some form of theoretical integration of statecentric 
and polycentric perspectives? As stressed in the introduction, statecentrism and 
polycentrism are not theories in themselves, but rather clusters of assumptions about 
polity, politics and policy that may constitute the basis for a range of different theories. 
It is likely that many analysts adopt certain assumptions not because of a deep-seated 
belief in their ontological ‘truth’, but because they capture empirical situations well 
enough to possess heuristic value and provide certain methodological advantages, such 
as well-defined ‘units’ of analysis and availability of corresponding datasets. In other 
words, in the practice of global policy studies often ontology follows methodology, 
rather than the other way round. But the fact that commitments to certain assumptions 
may more pragmatic than substantial raises the question of whether attempts at 
theoretical integration may be a particularly promising route to make further progress in 
global policy analysis.  
Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel (2003) identified four “models of theoretical dialogue” in 
political science: competitive testing; additive theory based on complementary domains 
of application; sequencing of theories; and subsumption. While competitive testing 
cannot be considered a form of synthesis, determining domains of application and 
sequencing are two synthetic strategies based on complementarity, and subsumption is a 
form of synthesis that interprets one theory as a special case of another. Since 
statecentrism and polycentrism are not theories, these models cannot be applied directly 
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to them.7 However, it is possible to consider some examples of dialogue in the light of 
the two analytical lenses. Drezner (2007) performs a ‘competitive test’ of explanations 
of regulatory outcomes, some of which stress the role of global civil society and others 
that stress how state power is used to promote domestic interests. He analyses regulation 
in the field of the internet, financial markets, genetically modified foods and intellectual 
property and concludes that, if their domestic politics allows great powers to agree 
among themselves, then global regulatory coordination will occur regardless of the 
support or opposition of transnational NGOs, IGOs and peripheral states. At most, 
NGOs can play a marginal role as lobbyists, protestors, monitors of compliance, and 
delegated standard-setters. What is notable for our purposes is that, while Drezner finds 
empirical support for a ‘statist’ theory, he reaches that conclusion by using analytical 
lenses that are at least partially polycentric, since otherwise comparing the influence of 
state and transnational nonstate actors would make little sense. 
 A related attempt at theoretical dialogue was made in the classic book by Robert 
Keohane and Joseph Nye, Jr, Power and Interdependence (1977). They presented their 
analytical constructs ‘realism’ and ‘complex interdependence’ as ideal types to which 
conditions in the real world may resemble more or less. One of the differences between 
the two ideal types is that in complex interdependence multiple channels of contact 
connect societies (i.e. states do not monopolize those contacts), which is compatible 
with polycentric assumptions. Keohane and Nye’s case studies implement a form of 
competitive testing and show, for instance, that negotiations over the law of the seas 
came closer to complex interdependence than negotiations over international finance. 
These findings can be seen as supporting a synthesis based on the ‘domains of 
application’ model, which tries to determine under which conditions one or the other 
theory is more plausible. As with Drezner, the possibility of such a synthesis depends 
on using polycentric lenses, if only to discover that complex interdependence is 
empirically weak in many contexts. A final example: Rosenau (1990, pp.97-98) argued 
that ‘[t]he universe of global politics had come to consist of two interactive worlds with 
overlapping memberships: a multicentric world of diverse, relatively equal actors, and a 
                                                 
7 For an example of how different models of dialogue can be applied to the relationship between 
two theories see Andreatta and Koenig-Archibugi (2010).   
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state-centric world in which national actors are still primary.’ Also in this case the 
possibility of ‘seeing’ both worlds depends on the use of polycentric lenses. 
 In sum: it often makes sense to subject to competitive testing theories that 
emphasise the influence of transnational nonstate actors on policy and theories that 
discount it; and it is often fruitful to try to define the respective domains of application 
of those theories. But both exercises depend on a prior adoption of polycentric lenses. 
Progress in global policy studies is thus likely to derive from a specific form of 
synthesis, namely the subsumption of statecentrism under polycentrism. Such a 
synthesis would be based on the awareness that the preponderance of states in global 
policy making would be a special case of a situation in which several types of actors are 
capable to create and implement policy; and that the political cleavages considered by 
statecentric studies (domestic cleavages on the one hand and international cleavages on 
the other) can be seen as a subset of the political cleavages that can occur according to 
the polycentric perspective. But this is a long term project. Until such a synthesis is 
achieved, the fruits of both perspectives deserve the full attention of scholars and policy 
makers interested in making global policy more responsive to the needs of the world’s 
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